Geopolitical Contestation or Developmental Alliance? A Comparative Study of Foreign Infrastructure Interventions in Nigeria and Burkina Faso (2018-2024)

1.0 Introduction The global resurgence of great power competition has shifted dramatically from military battlegrounds to economic and infrastructural frontiers, particularly in Africa (Carmody, 2020; Oqubay & Lin, 2019). Over the past decade, sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as a strategic arena where infrastructure development is no longer just about physical connectivity but about geopolitical influence, economic leverage, and ideological alignment (Brautigam, 2020; Ndzendze & Monyae, 2019). External actors such as China, Russia, and Western countries are now deeply engaged in infrastructure diplomacy, offering financing and technical expertise while simultaneously advancing their strategic interests (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2019; Ramani, 2023). Nigeria and Burkina Faso, two West African nations with stark contrasts in political history, economic scale, and governance institutions, provide fertile ground for analyzing these engagements. Nigeria, with its status as Africa’s largest economy and a regional powerhouse, has long attracted a mix of Chinese investments, Western aid, and multilateral financing (Onuoha, 2021; Obi, 2021). In contrast, Burkina Faso, a landlocked and less economically prominent state, has recently become a geopolitical flashpoint due to increasing Chinese and Russian presence, especially after its diplomatic recognition of Beijing in 2018 and the security vacuum created by successive coups (Simplice & Zhang, 2022; Yap & Essomba, 2023). The implication of this is that infrastructure investment in Africa has become embedded within the broader logic of geopolitical contestation, national interests, and South–South cooperation (Brown & Harman, 2013; OECD, 2021).

China’s presence in Africa is the most institutionalized and far-reaching among these powers. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese state-owned enterprises and financing institutions have executed massive infrastructure projects such as railways, airports, ports, and energy plants across the continent (Brautigam, 2020). As a state committed to a global responsibility in both political and economic sense, China has always adopted a neutral and non-interest-seeking development partner strategy in the bid to penetrate the African continent in order to bridge the development-deficit perennially plaguing the continent (Okeke, 2021). Consequently, Chinese investments are highly visible in megaprojects like the Lagos-Ibadan and Abuja-Kaduna standard-gauge railways (Obi, 2021). On its own part, Burkina Faso which resumed ties with China only in 2018, has also swiftly become a recipient of Chinese infrastructure diplomacy, including hospital construction and digital surveillance infrastructure (Yap & Essomba, 2023). In clear contrast, Russia’s engagement is more recent, selective, and heavily securitized. Since 2018, Russia has increased its footprint in Africa through arms deals, mining contracts, and private military companies like the Wagner Group, especially in fragile states such as Burkina Faso (Ramani, 2023). These interventions are often justified under the rhetoric of sovereignty and anti-imperialism, appealing to states disillusioned with Western conditionality (Cummings & Simpson, 2022).

This study seeks to address the lack of clarity about the underlying intentions and implications of these infrastructure engagements. Are these foreign interventions genuine attempts to promote development and economic transformation, or are they disguised geopolitical maneuvers serving the strategic interests of external actors at the expense of domestic sovereignty? This question is not only theoretically compelling but practically urgent, as African states increasingly face hard choices about whom to partner with and under what terms (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016; Obi, 2021). Despite the proliferation of foreign-funded infrastructure projects, many African states remain stuck in cycles of debt, underdevelopment, and dependency, raising questions about the sustainability and effectiveness of these engagements (Brautigam, 2020; OECD, 2021).

1.1 Research Objectives

The broad objective of this research is to critically examine the character and implications of foreign infrastructure intervention by China, Russia, and Western countries in Nigeria and Burkina Faso from 2018 to 2024. The specific objectives are:

1. to examine the distinct models and motivations of Chinese, Russian, and Western actors in infrastructure engagements in Nigeria and Burkina Faso;
2.  to determine the role of Nigeria and Burkina Faso agencies in shaping infrastructure partnerships with China, Russia, and Western actors; and
3.  to assess the developmental impact of foreign-funded infrastructure projects in Nigeria and Burkina Faso.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Geopolitical Competition and Strategic Influence in Africa

Africa has become an increasingly central arena for global power struggles as international actors compete for strategic influence through large-scale infrastructure investments. Unlike previous eras when colonization and military interventions were dominant methods of asserting control, today’s geopolitical contestation is expressed more subtly through economic engagement, particularly in the form of infrastructure development. China, Russia, and various Western countries have intensified their presence on the continent, often presenting infrastructure assistance as development cooperation, though such engagements frequently reflect broader political and strategic goals (Carmody, 2020; Ndzendze & Monyae, 2019).

China’s presence in Africa exemplifies the new form of geopolitical influence through infrastructure. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has significantly expanded its role as a financier and builder of African infrastructure. The country has financed roads, railways, dams, airports, and digital infrastructure in dozens of African countries, with Nigeria being a prominent beneficiary. These projects are often executed by Chinese state-owned enterprises and are tied to concessional loans that may not include the strict governance conditions typically associated with Western aid (Brautigam, 2020). While this model is praised by many African leaders for its speed and lack of political interference, critics argue that it may lead to economic dependency and weaken long-term sustainability, particularly where debt levels are high (Corkin, 2011; Mawdsley, 2020).

China also uses infrastructure diplomacy to build long-term political alliances and economic partnerships. In Nigeria, projects such as the Abuja-Kaduna railway and the Lagos-Ibadan railway have become symbols of China’s growing influence. While these projects support local development goals, they also serve to secure Chinese access to raw materials, open new markets for Chinese firms, and strengthen diplomatic ties (Power, 2022). In Burkina Faso, China re-established formal relations in 2018 after the country severed ties with Taiwan. Since then, Chinese proposals for roads and public buildings in Ouagadougou have been interpreted not just as development assistance, but as part of Beijing’s broader geopolitical realignment in West Africa (Yap & Essomba, 2023).

Russia, on its own, has adopted a different strategy. While it lacks China’s financial firepower, Russia uses a blend of military cooperation, energy partnerships, and historical solidarity to deepen its influence. The Russian government has actively pursued bilateral relations with countries experiencing political instability or tension with traditional Western powers. In Burkina Faso, for example, recent political upheavals and the growing rejection of French influence have created opportunities for Russian engagement. Moscow has offered to assist with energy infrastructure and security partnerships, positioning itself as a counterbalance to Western hegemony and as an alternative source of international support (Ramani, 2023). This approach often appeals to leaders seeking to assert national sovereignty or resist Western conditionality. Russia’s re-engagement with Africa also reflects a global contest for ideological and diplomatic space. The narrative of noninterference and mutual respect resonates in countries where Western aid is often seen as intrusive or tied to political reforms. Russian companies have shown interest in infrastructure sectors, including energy and transport, though implementation has often lagged due to limited financial capacity (Shubin, 2022). Nevertheless, Russia’s involvement, especially in francophone West Africa, contributes to the diversification of external actors on the continent, thereby intensifying geopolitical competition.

Western countries have responded to these developments by launching new initiatives that aim to offer an alternative to Chinese and Russian models. The European Union’s Global Gateway and the United States’ Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment are designed to provide high-quality infrastructure financing while promoting democratic values and transparency. These efforts seek to reassert Western leadership in development financing, yet they often fall short in terms of speed and scale compared to their Chinese counterpart (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2019). Moreover, the bureaucratic nature of Western aid, combined with governance-based conditions, can delay project implementation and undermine local ownership (Brown and Harman, 2013).

Nigeria and Burkina Faso illustrate different dimensions of this contest. Nigeria’s economic weight and diplomatic leverage allow it to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy. The country accepts infrastructure support from China, the West, and multilateral institutions, using its position to negotiate favorable terms and preserve policy space (Onuoha, 2021). The reason for this is not far-fetched. Basically, Nigeria’s national development has become stagnated such that it amounts to misnomer to say that the country has witnessed development (Okeke & Omojuwa, 2022; Okeke, 2023). Burkina Faso, however, with fewer financial and institutional resources, is more vulnerable to external shifts. Its increasing engagement with China and Russia reflects both a search for new partnerships and a realignment away from traditional Western allies following political instability (TASS, 2023).

2.1.1 Infrastructure Diplomacy and Developmental Outcomes

Infrastructure diplomacy has become a central mechanism through which foreign powers assert influence, build strategic partnerships, and promote their national interests under the guise of development assistance. In Africa, the continent’s vast infrastructure gaps have made it an attractive target for international investment. Countries such as China, Russia, and members of the Western bloc have utilized infrastructure projects as a means to deepen bilateral ties and secure access to markets, resources, and political influence (Carmody, 2020; Mohan and Power, 2021). Infrastructure diplomacy refers to the practice of using infrastructural investments such as roads, railways, ports, and energy facilities to cultivate relationships and strategic alliances, particularly with developing countries that face acute infrastructural deficits (Brautigam, 2009).

China stands as the most prominent actor in infrastructure diplomacy in Africa. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese firms, backed by state financing, have executed high-profile infrastructure projects across the continent. Achieving national development remains a goal of successive Nigerian governments. However, challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality persist with Nigeria currently hosting the largest extreme poverty population in the world (Okeke, 2020). In Nigeria, Today, China has become one of Nigeria’s major development partners and lenders, with total borrowing by Nigeria put at USD3.121 billion, representing 3.94 percent of Nigeria’s total public debt of USD79.303 billion and 11.28 percent of the external debt stock of USD27.67 billion as at March 31, 2020 (Okeke, 2021). Chinese-backed projects such as the Abuja Light Rail and the Lagos-Kano railway have been praised for their transformative potential in enhancing mobility and regional connectivity (Power et al., 2022). These projects are often fast-tracked compared to Western equivalents and are delivered without direct political conditions, making them attractive to African governments. In Burkina Faso, China’s re-engagement since 2018 has led to the proposal of several infrastructure initiatives, particularly in health and urban development. However, some critics note a lack of transparency in procurement processes and limited community consultation, raising doubts about long-term sustainability (Yap & Essomba, 2023).

In contrast to China’s approach, Western infrastructure diplomacy typically involves multilayered governance frameworks, environmental impact assessments, and emphasis on community participation. Institutions like the World Bank, European Investment Bank, and USAID emphasize infrastructure projects that are inclusive, transparent, and integrated with broader policy reforms. However, the extensive bureaucratic procedures and political conditionalities often slow down implementation, making Western assistance less attractive for governments seeking immediate results (Brown and Harman, 2013; Mawdsley, 2020). In Burkina Faso, several donor-funded road and energy programs were delayed due to governance concerns and institutional bottlenecks, highlighting the tension between accountability and efficiency.

Russia’s role in infrastructure diplomacy is more emergent. While it does not match China or the West in scale, Russia seeks to build strategic partnerships by supporting infrastructure in areas such as energy and defense. In Burkina Faso, recent announcements regarding Russian interest in energy projects were received favorably by a government eager to reduce dependence on former colonial powers. These projects are often packaged with security cooperation and arms deals, suggesting that Russia’s infrastructure engagement is part of a broader strategic agenda rather than a purely developmental one (Ramani, 2023). The developmental outcomes of such partnerships remain uncertain due to limited transparency and implementation records.

2.1.2 African Agency and National Policy Autonomy

The concept of African agency in international relations and development discourse has gained renewed scholarly attention in recent years. It challenges the long-standing narrative of Africa as a passive recipient of foreign interventions, assistance, and influence. Instead, it emphasizes the ability of African states, actors, and institutions to make strategic choices, negotiate partnerships, and assert sovereignty in shaping their development trajectories. Within the context of foreign infrastructure engagement by China, Russia, and Western countries, the notion of African agency is essential in evaluating how countries like Nigeria and Burkina Faso navigate external pressures while preserving national policy autonomy (Brown and Harman, 2013; Mohan and Power, 2021).

In Nigeria, a country with considerable economic and political leverage in the region, African agency manifests through a diversified infrastructure strategy that draws on resources from both Western and non-Western partners. Nigeria has engaged in strategic infrastructure deals with China, including the Lagos-Kano railway and Abuja-Kaduna rail projects, while also maintaining partnerships with multilateral institutions like the World Bank and African Development Bank for power and road projects (Obi, 2017; Onuoha, 2021). This reflects a deliberate attempt to avoid overdependence on any single foreign actor and instead utilize geopolitical competition to secure favorable terms. Nigerian officials have often cited the need to retain decision-making power in the design and implementation of these projects, despite the economic allure of Chinese financing.

Burkina Faso presents a more constrained but still significant case of African agency. After severing ties with Taiwan in 2018, Burkina Faso reestablished diplomatic relations with China, opening the door for new infrastructure partnerships. While financial limitations and political instability have affected the country’s bargaining power, Burkinabe leaders have used this diplomatic shift to attract alternative investment streams beyond traditional Western donors. Infrastructure projects in health, roads, and water provision have been supported by China, and Burkina Faso has increasingly sought support from emerging partners like Russia to complement or counterbalance Western influence (Yap & Essomba, 2023; Ramani, 2023). These actions demonstrate a strategic recalibration of foreign partnerships, grounded in an effort to advance national priorities even within limited fiscal space.

However, the exercise of African agency is not without challenges. Structural constraints such as weak institutions, debt vulnerabilities, and governance deficiencies often limit the autonomy of African states. Many infrastructure deals, particularly those involving large-scale loans, can come with implicit or explicit expectations from foreign partners. For example, Chinese infrastructure financing often requires the use of Chinese contractors, equipment, and sometimes the collateralization of strategic assets, thereby constraining local decision-making and reducing transparency (Brautigam, 2009; Corkin, 2011). Western development partners, on the other hand, may insist on regulatory reforms, human rights commitments, or environmental assessments, which, while well-intentioned, can delay implementation and sometimes override domestic planning frameworks (Mawdsley, 2020). African policy autonomy is also shaped by domestic political dynamics. In Nigeria, for instance, major infrastructure announcements often coincide with political campaigns, raising concerns about whether decisions reflect developmental goals or electoral calculations (Power, 2022). Similarly, in Burkina Faso, infrastructure has occasionally been used to placate urban unrest without a long-term strategic framework, especially in the face of public dissatisfaction with former colonial powers (Carmody, 2020). Despite these limitations, African agency should not be underestimated. It is often expressed through subtle and context-specific strategies. For example, Nigeria has established public-private partnership frameworks and institutional reforms aimed at improving infrastructure governance, while Burkina Faso has leveraged regional bodies like the West African Economic and Monetary Union to gain technical and financial support for infrastructure planning (Sachs , 2019; Onuoha, 2021).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The World-Systems Theory, first conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s, offers a structuralist approach to understanding global political economy. Wallerstein developed the theory as a critique of modernization theory, which suggested that all countries inevitably move through linear stages of development. In contrast, the World-Systems perspective argues that countries are embedded in a single global capitalist system that structures unequal relationships between them (Wallerstein, 1974). This theory provides a macro-sociological explanation for global inequality, colonial legacy, and the dynamics of underdevelopment, making it highly relevant for analyzing the patterns of infrastructure engagement in Africa by foreign powers.

At the heart of the World-Systems Theory is the tripartite classification of countries into core, semi-periphery, and periphery zones. Core countries are highly industrialized, technologically advanced, and politically dominant. They extract economic surplus and labor from the periphery, which consists of less developed nations that are often resource-rich but politically and economically dependent. The semi-periphery serves as an intermediate zone, exhibiting characteristics of both core and periphery regions, and often mediating between the two (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982). According to this framework, global inequality is maintained through a historical process of accumulation and exploitation, where periphery nations are structurally positioned to serve the needs of core countries. The theory posits that international economic relations are not neutral but serve to reproduce the dominance of core states. Trade, investment, and aid are not instruments of mutual benefit but mechanisms through which core nations retain control over global resources and labor. Infrastructure development becomes a key tool in this dynamic. By financing roads, ports, railways, and energy systems, core states embed peripheral regions more deeply into the global capitalist system. While such infrastructure may spur short-term growth, it often reinforces patterns of dependency, extraction, and limited industrial transformation (Amin, 1976; Chase-Dunn, 1980).

2.2.1 Theory Application

Applying the World-Systems Theory to the case of Nigeria and Burkina Faso allows us to interrogate the real intentions and consequences of infrastructure engagements by China, Russia, and Western powers. These African countries, positioned in the global periphery, have long histories of economic marginalization and dependence on foreign capital. Their development agendas are heavily influenced by external powers who present infrastructure as a pathway to modernization. However, the theory compels us to ask whether these infrastructure interventions genuinely serve local needs or primarily benefit external actors seeking to expand influence, access resources, and secure markets. For instance, China’s infrastructure diplomacy in Africa, including in Nigeria and Burkina Faso, is often framed as a South-South partnership. Yet, the World-Systems perspective would caution against this narrative, highlighting the asymmetric nature of these relationships. On the other hand, Russia’s recent re-entry into African development, including military and infrastructure engagement in Burkina Faso, similarly reflects an effort to reassert geopolitical influence in a multipolar world. Western engagement, traditionally spearheaded by the World Bank, European Union, and bilateral donors, has often imposed governance and economic reforms as prerequisites for infrastructure support. Although these efforts are couched in developmental language, World-Systems theorists argue that such reforms entrench neoliberal agendas that benefit multinational corporations and capital mobility, while constraining local industrialization and state capacity.

3.0 Research Methodology

This study employed a qualitative research method, specifically utilizing a explanatory research design to explore the topic. The primary method of data collection used in this research is the documentary technique, relying on secondary materials like books, journals, newspapers, and official publications. The study adopted the content analysis method to systematically identify and interpret specified characteristics of messages within documents.

4.0 Data Presentation and Analysis

The comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, and Western infrastructure engagement in Nigeria and Burkina Faso revealed three significant patterns, each reflecting distinct approaches and broader strategic objectives. These patterns underline how external infrastructure investments are rarely neutral or solely developmental in purpose. Instead, they often mirror the geopolitical ambitions and ideological orientations of the investing countries, which in turn shape the developmental trajectories and political alignments of African nations.

One of the most prominent findings was the expansive and accelerated role of China in both countries. Chinese investments were characterized by speed, scope, and volume, covering sectors such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, and public housing. In Nigeria, large-scale projects such as railways, highways, and hydropower plants showcased China’s capacity to execute complex infrastructure in record time. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, although engagement was less extensive due to political instability, China maintained visibility through hospital construction, road rehabilitation, and digital infrastructure initiatives. However, this rapid expansion often came at the cost of growing debt exposure and structural dependency. Chinese financing models typically involved concessional loans or commercial credit tied to Chinese contractors, which limited local ownership, restricted technology transfer, and raised concerns about the long-term financial autonomy of the host nations. While some projects delivered immediate benefits such as job creation and improved connectivity, the broader outcome tended to deepen financial vulnerability and reduce policy flexibility for national governments.

In contrast, Russia’s engagement in both Nigeria and Burkina Faso was more targeted and selective, with a stronger emphasis on political alignment, military cooperation, and strategic resource extraction. Rather than flooding the countries with numerous civilian infrastructure projects, Russia focused on cultivating influence through bilateral defense agreements, energy partnerships, and elite political networks. Burkina Faso became a key site of Russian re-engagement, especially following political shifts that distanced the country from traditional Western allies. The presence of Russian security firms and military advisors, often operating alongside mining and energy deals, illustrated a convergence between hard power and economic interests. In Nigeria, although less pronounced, Russian firms sought to enter strategic sectors such as nuclear energy, petroleum infrastructure, and arms trade. This approach, while not as visible as China’s, underscored a different form of geopolitical assertion. It relied less on volume and more on strategic depth, often aligning with governments that faced legitimacy crises or sought alternatives to Western conditionalities. The developmental implications of this model were ambiguous. While it offered some diversification in foreign partnerships, it did not necessarily result in broad-based infrastructure development or local economic empowerment.

Together, these three findings suggest that infrastructure development in Nigeria and Burkina Faso during the period under study was shaped less by a shared vision for economic transformation and more by the strategic calculations of external powers. Rather than forming a unified developmental alliance, China, Russia, and the West pursued divergent agendas, using infrastructure as a medium for influence. The countries themselves became arenas of competition where investment decisions were guided as much by geopolitical positioning as by developmental need. Although certain projects improved roads, ports, and power access, their long-term implications raised critical questions about national sovereignty, economic self-reliance, and the capacity of African states to chart their own developmental paths. These findings reinforce the notion that infrastructure diplomacy is not only about building physical assets but also about constructing political relationships and institutional dependencies. The infrastructure choices made during this period may lock Nigeria and Burkina Faso into particular geopolitical or economic alignments for decades to come. Whether these alignments benefit the broader population depends on the ability of national leaders to assert agency, align foreign investments with national plans, and demand greater accountability from all partners. Without such assertiveness, the infrastructure boom risks becoming a new phase in the historical cycle of external domination and internal marginalization.

5.0 Conclusion

The comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, and Western infrastructure engagement in Nigeria and Burkina Faso reveals that external development efforts are deeply intertwined with global geopolitical strategies. Rather than forming a unified effort toward sustainable development, each actor pursued infrastructure as a means of expanding influence and securing long-term strategic interests. While Chinese projects offered rapid implementation, they often contributed to debt burdens and dependency. Russian engagements were narrower but closely aligned with military and political objectives, raising concerns about governance and stability. Western interventions emphasized values such as transparency and sustainability but frequently lacked the speed and scale to meet urgent infrastructure needs. In all cases, the interests of the investing countries shaped project design, implementation, and impact more than the developmental needs of the host nations. As a result, infrastructure development during the period studied reflected more of a geopolitical contestation than a cooperative alliance for national advancement.

6.0 Recommendations

In view of the findings, the study makes the following recommendations:

1. Adopt a Unified National Framework for Managing Foreign Infrastructure Engagements

It is recommended that Nigeria develops a clear and comprehensive national framework to coordinate all foreign infrastructure investments. This framework should establish guiding principles, regulatory standards, and strategic priorities that align with national development plans. It would enable the government to evaluate, prioritize, and negotiate projects based on long-term value, rather than geopolitical pressure or short-term gains. A unified approach would also prevent fragmented or duplicated efforts across sectors and regions. Most importantly, it would empower national institutions to retain greater control over the design, financing, and execution of infrastructure projects, while also facilitating coordination among ministries, sub-national governments, and development partners.

2. Strengthen Debt Management and Public Financial Accountability Systems

A robust reform to debt management and public financial oversight should be undertaken so as to strengthen the institutional capacity of Nigeria’s debt management offices and financial regulatory bodies towards ensuring that borrowing decisions are based on transparent criteria and sound fiscal analysis. This requires the enforcement of clear debt sustainability thresholds where all loans and financial agreements are subjected to public disclosure and legislative review. This will help to prevent future debt crises, ensure responsible fiscal planning, and improve investor and citizen confidence in the country’s financial governance.

3. Promote Transparent, Inclusive, and Locally-Owned Infrastructure Development Processes

The study emphasizes that infrastructure development should not only be efficient and well-funded but also socially inclusive and locally anchored. To achieve this, the government must establish open consultation processes with civil society, community stakeholders, and local businesses before committing to major infrastructure projects. Local content policies should be enforced to ensure that domestic firms, workers, and knowledge systems are integrated into project design and execution. This will not only build national capacity but also reduce the sense of external imposition or elite capture. Transparency mechanisms, including public monitoring platforms and grievance redress systems, should be institutionalized to promote accountability and reduce corruption.

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